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Theorists of justice have to steer between two rocks. On the one hand, 
there is the intuition that an individual’s morally permitted preferences 
should be respected: it is not justifiable to intervene with them. On the 
other hand, such preferences are the result of formation processes, which 
are notoriously vulnerable to manipulation. Does justice demand respect 
for preferences that produce or perpetuate injustices, suffered either by the 
individual herself or by others? In this paper, I will investigate this problem 
in the context of the ambiguous tenet of neutrality. The field of gender 
justice has extended Rawlsian theories of justice in order to account for 
structural factors, such as socialisation. Some theorists have argued that the 
justice-inhibiting character of some preferences implies that the first intui-
tion should be rejected in favour of the second in some cases, which leads 
to the conclusion that some preferences are like obstacles standing in the 
way of justice and should thus be reformed. I will call this the ‘Normative 
Hierarchy View’ and argue that it is problematic. It presupposes a certain 
attitude with respect to those who hold the preferences, which forecloses a 
politically salient kind of respect. Furthermore, at the more general level, 
there are at least two major problems with the kind of objectification that 
is at stake in those accounts: it requires a reduction of practical reason to 
theoretical reason and is incompatible with the criterion of publicity.
In order to illustrate what is at stake in this paper, I will give an exam-
ple. We do not even have to leave behind the comfort of our own home in 
order to encounter the central problem. There is an unjust social tendency, 
deeply ingrained in modern societies, to view women as being ultimately 
responsible for housework and childcare, even on top of a full-time job. 
The men in the family are often prepared to ‘help out’, but this very phrase 
suggests that the tasks are not divided evenly. Many women take on a 
‘second shift’ as a result, in effect working two full-time jobs: one as a 
professional and one as a ‘housewife’. This was analysed as a case of injus-
tice in an influential book on the subject (Hochschild & Machen, 2012). 
I will assume throughout this paper that such situations are indeed unjust. 
Let us now imagine a woman who is aware not only of this fact, but 
also of the sexist history that helped to produce both the tendency and the 
corresponding behaviours. She may still feel that it is in fact ultimately her 
responsibility to do housework and to take care of the children, so that she 
will prefer to do all of the work herself rather than ‘delegate’ it: she may 
consciously embrace the motives already suggested to her by the social 
mechanism as her own, and provide legitimate reasons for her preference. 
Surely, her preference is morally permissible. But there is another side to 
this story. Decisions such as the one I just described help to perpetuate the 
unjust social tendency, even if the latter did not motivate the woman in 
question. Her decision will emphasise the normalcy of viewing women as 
bearing ultimate responsibility for household and childcare tasks, which 
means that it will become increasingly difficult for women to take on other 
roles within the household. Social scientists refer to such mechanisms as 
forms of entrenchment. What should a theorist of justice do? On the one 
hand, she will reason that the woman’s preference should be respected; on 
the other hand, she will theorise that it produces injustices insofar as it 
further entrenches unjust role patterns (in this case) that permeate society. 
This is clearly a problem, since none of the two intuitions that underlie 
these responses can be said to automatically trump the other.
In order to treat the problems that arise from these conflicting intui-
tions, some theoretical background is required. A short consideration of 
the Rawlsian ideal of neutrality will be followed by a general introduction 
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to gender justice, considered here as an extension of Rawls’s project. The 
idea is that social mechanisms are more important to justice than the latter 
appreciated. Some versions of this account embrace the Normative Hier-
archy View. Such a view presupposes an objective attitude with respect to 
preferences, which I will contrast to Ian Carter’s notion of opacity respect. 
The political relevance of the normative hierarchy will be demonstrated by 
reference to the ascription of false consciousness, which is a prime exam-
ple of the objective attitude at work. I will also provide two arguments 
against assuming the objective attitude in political philosophy, both of 
which build on the work on Immanuel Kant. These arguments will be 
aimed against the reduction of practical reason to theoretical reason and 
show that the problematisation of particular preferences is not compatible 
with the criterion of publicity. In closing, I will propose an alternative 
view, which does not zoom in on particular preferences, but limits itself to 
maximally enabling reflexivity.
1. A Dilemma for Theorists of Neutrality 
The importance of respecting preferences was established in Rawls’s 
foundational work for contemporary theories of justice. John Rawls’s con-
ception of justice includes what he calls the ‘priority of the right over the 
good’ (Rawls, 1999: 27-28). Rawls argues that for a society to be just, 
every individual participating in that society should be free to choose her 
own version of the good life, as well as the means to attain it. The func-
tion of the just society is not to steer the preferences of its residents into 
any particular direction, but rather to make sure that each resident enjoys 
equal opportunities to attain whichever goals she chooses. This includes 
a fair division among citizens of primary goods, that is to say, resources 
that anyone with what Rawls calls a rational life plan would prefer to have 
more of rather than less (ibid.: 54-55). What plan an individual chooses, 
however, is entirely up to her. The Rawlsian approach towards the good 
life, then, has neutrality as its watchword as far as justice is concerned.
Most contemporary theoreticians have joined Rawls in his plea for 
neutrality, although many have tried to extend it to domains they thought 
to be neglected by his theory. For the purposes of this paper, I will like-
wise assume that neutrality is a necessary criterion for principles of justice. 
However, it should be appreciated that ‘neutrality’ is a versatile term, which 
can be applied on many levels. Even for Rawls, neutrality with respect to 
people’s notion of the good necessarily entails a negative attitude towards 
some states of affairs. For instance, since he is committed to religious neu-
trality, he will have to condemn theocratic political regimes as essentially 
unjust. More generally, while neutrality may seem to be a safe option and is 
sometimes associated with a kind of passivity, principled neutrality entails 
the denial that any positive argument can be made to decide the issue. In 
other words, to be neutral as a matter of principle between positions x and 
y is equivalent to the claim that there can be no philosophical grounds to 
justifiably prefer x over y, or vice versa – and thus to oppose any claim to 
the effect that such grounds have been discovered. To the theorist of neu-
trality, the implication of a non-neutral theory is that it would unjustly 
allow differential treatment of citizens on the basis of their conformity to 
the preferred ideal. The supposedly neutral party can thus be expected to 
wage war anyway, and not only on far fronts. Insofar as the theorist’s goal 
is to bring about social reform in her own society, the elements of that 
society that do not conform to her political virtue of neutrality are likely 
to be experienced as obstacles standing in the way of justice. 
This may lead to a somewhat paradoxical situation. What if the per-
ceived obstacles include the preferences of an agent belonging to the society 
in question? In that case, it is unclear what it would mean to be truly neu-
tral. If we take respect for individual preferences to be our most important 
value, then even preferences that produce or perpetuate injustices will have 
to be allowed. Thus, neutrality with respect to the aforementioned kind 
of preferences could lead to a non-neutral and hence unjust society. If we 
leave the condition of moral permissibility to one side for a moment, it is 
clear that the above is relevant in blatantly racist cases, for instance: pref-
erences to the effect that members of some ethnic group are to be denied 
adequate schooling are obviously problematic in the context of justice. The 
reverse is also true: neutrality with respect to the requirements of justice 
requires that some preferences be treated non-neutrally. In this case, a cer-
tain feature of the just society is deemed more important than respecting 
all preferences equally, which would presumably be justified by reference 
to the effects of certain preferences upon society. For example, if racism 
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is unjust, we will deny card-carrying racists the opportunity to set up a 
system of education that is based on their specific ideology. This involves 
withholding from specific groups the right to educate according to one’s 
own principles. In this sense, it constitutes a violation of neutrality. 
One aspect of neutrality as an element of justice calls for the sacrifice of 
another aspect in both of these cases, so that we are faced with a dilemma1. 
I believe this tension between different versions of neutrality is an urgent 
problem for theories of justice that are built around this concept, and one 
that has not been addressed thus far. Perhaps this can be explained by the 
fact that theorists of justice have either relied fully on the intuition that 
an individual should be free to hold any morally permissible preference, 
or focused entirely on the role of societies in the formation of preferences. 
Theorists of justice have not explored the problems that result from these 
opposing directions of research. But while it is true that preferences have 
a highly personal character and should be respected, it is equally true that 
they have a deep and lasting impact on society.
Before I investigate potential ways to resolve the tension, two qualifi-
cations should be made. First, in order to be paradoxical, the problematic 
preference needs to be politically relevant. Clearly, a desert hermit with 
strong religious views does not pose a problem. He is entitled to hold any 
belief. In fact, a Rawlsian version of a just society would provide him with 
the primary goods needed to support his way of living. However, the prob-
lem is only avoided in this case because of the hermit’s isolation from the 
rest of society. His convictions and preferences, as well as the actions that 
follow from them, are moral, not political. The problem only arises when 
the non-neutrality has an effect on the wider society. This is so in the case 
of what I will call a politically relevant preference.
Second, it is not hard to think of cases in the realm of religious con-
victions and preferences that have far-reaching consequences for society. 
It is surely unjust to force any individual to kneel before the extremism of 
others. However, religious extremism is sufficiently openly violent to have 
been prohibited by law in most countries. I will not argue for a particular 
position on the relation between law as a societal-corrective device and 
questions of justice. However, since we are speaking of cases where the 
theorist aims for social reform, it is clear that we need not discuss prefer-
ences that are already on the social agenda to the extent that they have 
been criminalized2.
At this point, it is possible to doubt the existence of preferences that 
simultaneously satisfy the criteria of political relevance, legality and non-
neutrality. Does contemporary politics effectively silence certain groups, 
for instance? There is certainly no lack of groups who claim that they are 
being systematically disadvantaged in this way. While the status of some 
groups may be under siege by parties on the extreme sides of the political 
spectrum, legislature itself does not seem to allow for differential treat-
ment. However, the latter qualification above does allow for a proviso. 
While every person is formally an equal participant in society, it does not 
follow that society actually treats all of those who participate in it fairly. 
Consider, for instance, the mentally ill, children, and women. While legis-
lative mechanisms are in place to safeguard their interests (a sceptic might 
add ‘or to keep up the appearance that their interests are taken seriously’), 
there is a variety of ways in which these mechanisms could fail to lead to 
the desired result. Perhaps the interests of these groups are misrepresented; 
perhaps the legislature is adequate in itself, but not enforced properly, etc. 
Thus, while ‘women’s issues’ are undeniably on the social agenda, that 
fact is in itself not incompatible with unjust treatment of women. For the 
groups mentioned and perhaps many others, the case could be made that 
the real problems have not been adequately dealt with3.
In fact, many theorists explicitly make this case, particularly those 
operating in the field of gender justice. There is a substantial literature on 
this subject. Moreover, gender justice theorists have attempted to articu-
late a way out of the dilemma concerning us here. For these reasons, I have 
chosen to engage myself exclusively with gender justice rather than with, 
for instance, mental illness justice.
2. Gender Justice and the Normative Hierarchy View
Inequalities stemming from gender issues were not addressed by the 
theories of justice devised by Rawls and his followers. Still, the field of 
gender justice is currently active in criticizing particular features of con-
temporary society, with many theorists advocating some kind of social 
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reform (e.g. Gheaus & Robeyns, 2011). The underlying theories of gender 
justice claim to address injustices that are neglected by ‘classical’ theories, 
particularly ‘inequalities within the family around the domestic division of 
labour, especially over child care and other forms of caregiving’ (Brighouse 
& Wright, 2008: 360). Two further claims have to be made in order to 
substantiate the need for a gender justice account, the first being that 
such inequalities are unjust and the second that they are the product of 
mechanisms that are not given proper theoretical weight in other theories 
(and that gender justice is able to do so). I will assume the truth of the first 
claim. The second is central to my purposes here. 
The Rawlsian tradition has often been understood in terms of two core 
attitudes: endowment-insensitivity and ambition-sensitivity (Kymlicka, 
1990: 76-85). The endowments, or, more generally, the resources one 
starts out with in life should not affect one’s entitlements either positively 
or negatively, whereas the projects that one chooses to pursue during one’s 
life will mean that one will be entitled to either more or less. In the stand-
ard example: if two people start out with two identical plots of land in 
identical circumstances, the one who cultivates it the most and thus earns 
more is entitled to her profits. Rawls’s original statement of this distinction 
is that he aims to correct (only) inequalities that are due to factors he 
deems ‘contingent from a moral point of view’ (Rawls, 1999: 14). People’s 
autonomously chosen preferences do not fall into this category, while pref-
erences that are for instance the direct result of growing up in conditions 
of extreme poverty or affluence would presumably qualify. Gender justice 
claims that there are important factors that are not captured by this dual-
ism of endowment versus ambition. Of particular importance are processes 
of preference formation inherent in society. Consider the following case:
‘[T]he woman involved possesses reasons for acting as she does [i.e. 
sacrificing her career, JK], and she is fully and vividly aware of the way in 
which her desires and dispositions have been influenced by processes of 
socialisation. She rejects the idea that women are primarily responsible 
for children, but she has a deep desire to devote herself exclusively to 
raising her children. She acknowledges that socialisation has shaped 
her very identity, including her deepest needs and desires, to the point 
of conceding that she may not have had those desires but for her 
socialisation. But she still reflectively endorses those needs and desires as 
her own. […] It would not seem just to require her to bear the full cost 
of her decision to look after her children personally, for that would fail 
to give proper weight to the profound effect of sexist norms and images.’ 
(Mason, 2000: 242)
These are the elements that are thought to be missing from classical 
theories of justice: the social mechanisms that shape preferences, such as 
socialisation and the norms that not only guide such processes, but also 
assume institutional form and thus an action-guiding and limiting charac-
ter, partly determining the choices of those for whose lives the norms are of 
importance. Anca Gheaus gives an example of an injustice that may result 
from the latter in the context of a discussion about the glass-ceiling effect. It 
concerns statistical discrimination in labour market situations. As the author 
explains, ‘if enough women put less time than most men into advancing 
their careers because they dedicate their time to meeting essential needs of 
[their] nearest and dearest, it may be reasonable for potential employers to 
expect any woman who has needy dependents to do so’ (Gheaus, 2012: 9; 
emphasis in the original). Because of the limited knowledge of any employer, 
this applies whether the woman under consideration accepts the relevant 
norms or not. What is crucial in such cases is that for the affected groups, 
‘access to some central components of most, if not all, individuals’ idea of a 
good life’ is rendered ‘excessively, and unequally, costly’ (ibid.: 10) by gender 
norms. This inequality constitutes an injustice.
We now have a general picture of what is at stake in theories of gender 
justice. Indeed, I can do no better than a general picture, as gender justice 
is characterised by its internal divisions. In order to specify the kind of gen-
der justice I will have in mind in this paper, I will proceed to summarise 
the kind of analysis that is characteristic of it. 
The central point is that there is a dimension to human existence that 
escapes classical theories of justice. Preferences like those of the career-sac-
rificing mother described above may seem innocent and indeed legitimate 
enough, but because of the gendered society in which her decision to devote 
herself to raising her children is situated, we should not just ask whether 
or not she is free to live according to her preferences, but inquire into the 
wider social effects. Her lifestyle choice ‘has a direct impact in raising the 
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costs the woman would have to pay in order to (re)join the labour market 
(if she stays at home), or to engage in a more successful career (if she works 
part-time); it also has an indirect effect on the costs other women will have 
to pay for access to the labour market by validating, and thus entrenching, 
gender norms, including those that lead to unconscious and statistical dis-
crimination of women’ (Gheaus, 2012: 21). Therefore, from the viewpoint 
of gender justice, the costs of a ‘gender-neutral’ lifestyle should be lowered 
relative to gendered lifestyles as much as is possible (ibid.: 16, 21). For the 
purposes of this paper, gender neutrality as an ideal can be thought of in 
quite general terms as the extension of the Rawlsian idea of neutrality to 
domains that Rawls never theorised on: in this case, the specific problems 
raised by relations between the genders.  
This kind of analysis fulfils the criteria established in the first section: 
it is deemed problematic that formation processes exert influence over the 
preferences women come to hold in ways that lead to injustices. This ful-
fils the criterion of non-neutrality on some level, because neutrality with 
respect to preferences is sacrificed here for neutrality on the level of the 
just society. Furthermore, the decision of the career-sacrificing mother is a 
prime example of a politically relevant preference because of its entrench-
ing effect. Secondly, it is morally and legally unproblematic. Finally, the 
authors discussed strive for some kind of social reform.
This way of theorizing is one way of resolving the tension that was sig-
nalled at the very beginning of this paper. If we are serious about creating 
a (gender-)neutral society, it follows that some preferences, namely those 
which can be explained by reference to formation processes of a particular 
kind, are not worthy of the same respect as other preferences. Notice that 
this is true for the arguments presented here only in a very subtle way. 
They do not implore us to remove individuals with certain preferences 
from society: they only implore us to remove them from the ideally just 
society. Nevertheless, it does follow that their preferences are, in the earlier 
sense, like obstacles standing in the way of justice. It would be better (from 
the viewpoint of justice, at least: there may be overriding reasons to be 
addressed in other domains) if they were not there4.
Let us assume for the sake of the argument that the effect of norms on 
preferences is sociologically observable. This hardly seems a problematic 
assumption: in fact, we may wonder whether any preference would exist 
without such formation processes. As the literature on gender justice sug-
gests, preferences are not ‘given’ in any sense – rather, they are produced 
and are self-reproducing because of their entrenching effects. These two 
dimensions of preferences correspond to a view of them as respectively 
having been caused and themselves being the cause of other (similar) 
social phenomena. Gender justice theorists think of preferences in these 
terms: because they were formed in a certain kind of society, they were 
decisively influenced by some pre-existing form of sexism and will per-
petuate gendered practices at the expense of women in the future. There 
are preferences that do not have this unjust kind of structure or impact: 
on that basis, we can establish a normative hierarchy of preferences. Mor-
ally permitted preferences that have justice-inhibiting qualities are on the 
‘wrong’ end of the scale; those that are neutral with respect to justice are 
somewhere in the middle; and those that promote justice are to be found 
in the higher regions of the scale. I will refer to this view of preferences as 
a feature of some theories of gender justice as ‘the Normative Hierarchy 
View’ (NHV). For the sake of clarity, I will recapitulate its main points. 
A proponent of NHV subscribes to the following tenets:
i) Preferences are subject to formation processes;
ii) Preferences have a societal impact;
iii) It is possible for a particular morally permitted preference either 
to (a) have unjust societal consequences, (b) to be neutral with 
respect to justice or (c) to be justice-promoting;
iv) When it has unjust societal consequences, the preference itself is 
like an obstacle standing in the way of justice;
v) Thus, justice requires that the societal impact of preferences with 
unjust societal consequences be altered. This is to be done by 
social reform aimed at influencing particular formation processes.
The normative hierarchy itself groups preferences together on the basis 
of their consequences in terms of justice. It maps them onto a normative 
scale. This is needed because in order to effectuate the right kinds of social 
reform, it will first have to be known how particular preferences ‘rank’ 
when seen from the point of view of justice.
11
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Julien Kloeg | Respecting Preferences: Gender Justice and the Normative Hierarchy View
3. A reconsideration of Strawson-objectivity
The establishment of such a hierarchy with a view to promote one kind 
of preferences at the cost of another kind presupposes the assumption of 
a certain attitude towards the individuals that hold them. Peter Strawson 
has considered the question of proper attitudes in normative contexts, 
namely in the context of morality and free will. He distinguishes between 
the attitude of ‘involvement or participation’ and ‘what might be called 
the objective attitude’ (Strawson, 1974: 9). I will first briefly describe 
Strawson’s account of these ‘reactive attitudes’ and then try to incorporate 
it into political philosophy.
Strawson’s objective and participatory attitudes are types of reactions 
to behaviour: ‘the compulsive behaviour of the neurotic’ and ‘the tiresome 
behaviour of a very young child’ (Strawson, 1974: 10) call for a kind of 
distance that leads us to judge these kinds of behaviour differently: this is 
what he calls objectivity. If an individual is a neurotic or a child, as in these 
examples, this serves to qualify the extent to which she is subject to blame. 
It is as if, by assuming the objective attitude, we relieve her of some of the 
duties that usually attach to human existence.
My concern is political rather than moral. Although Strawson’s origi-
nal concept of objectivity may indeed be proper in the context of social 
policy as opposed to the personal realm, I will attempt to reinvent his 
distinction in such a way that it applies within the political realm itself. 
This implies, for our purposes, that there are policy situations where the 
objective attitude should not be assumed. The altered version of Strawson-
objectivity I have in mind will draw on Ian Carter’s (2012) introduction 
of the notion of the objective attitude in the context of political philoso-
phy, as well as on his proposed alternative. It is this political notion of the 
objective attitude that will be applied to the dilemma I started out with. To 
recapitulate: the ideal of neutrality is ambiguous in the context of prefer-
ences. In particular, theorists of justice have to choose between neutrality 
with respect to preferences on the one hand, and neutrality as relevant to 
the just society on the other. We have seen that NHV solves the dilemma 
by preferring the just society to have equal respect for preferences: in other 
words, if particular preferences are obstacles standing in the way of justice, 
then they should be reformed.
This idea of the desirability of reform casts those whose preferences 
would be reformed in a certain light. It should be clear that I do not advo-
cate that policymakers should view the objects of their policies in the same 
way they view their friends. Nor will I comment on the perception any 
theorist has of her own work, as either an ‘objective’ or intersubjective 
contribution to science or philosophy. The point is rather that to assume 
the objective attitude with respect to individually held preferences is to 
conceive of them as matters to be ‘cured or trained’, so that we can at most 
‘pretend to reason’ with those who hold the preferences insofar as we view 
them objectively (cf. Strawson, 1974: 10). This is the common denomina-
tor of the moral and the political use of the concept ‘objective attitude’: in 
the case of the neurotic or the child, we recognise that their subjectivity 
only problematically allows for the usual judgments of blame. I will argue 
that NHV likewise problematises the subjectivity of individuals.
Three steps are to be taken in order to evaluate what the consequences 
of Strawson’s distinction are for our case. First, the argument that I will 
develop presupposes that NHV is characterised by the objective attitude. 
Second, I will proceed to investigate and assess Ian Carter’s explicit rejec-
tion of the objective attitude in the context of political philosophy. Third, 
I will proceed to what is perhaps the most (historically) significant instan-
tiation of Strawson-objectivity in the context of politics: the ascription of 
false consciousness. The comparison between particular versions of gender 
justice and Marxism will serve to highlight some important features of the 
political variety of Strawson-objectivity, as well as reveal some problems.
To establish that NHV does indeed assume an objective attitude, 
I need to consider the way it conceives of the preferences it deems 
problematic. It seems clear that with respect to structurally biased 
preferences, NHV attempts to supply reasons in order to reform such 
preferences, and to remove the elements of society that have produced 
them. Because this applies to some, but not all preferences, we are left 
with a normative hierarchy. Curing and training is all that can be done. 
In this analysis, preferences are constituted by their history in such a 
way that even the reasons that are supplied in support of them are seen 
as derivative of social mechanisms. We can surely not say that those who 
hold preferences on the ‘wrong’ end of the scale are given a fair hear-
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ing on this account. If we consider preferences to be comprised of both 
their content and their history, then, indeed, NHV is characterised by an 
objective attitude towards them.
This leads me to consider a contrasting account of how political phi-
losophy should approach preferences. Carter (2012) argues that respect of 
the kind that is needed to ground egalitarianism is possible only if there 
is no concern for ‘internal constraints  within particular agents’: from the 
point of view of institutions, we should only consider the ‘outward dig-
nity’ of individuals. That is to say, in order to ascribe ‘dignity as an agential 
capacity’ to any individual we do have to establish whether a minimum of 
empirical conditions obtain, but not to what degree5. An example is in order 
here. Let us suppose that for an individual to count as equal to all others, 
she will have to possess rationality. It would now suffice for an individual 
to possess rationality above a certain minimum in order to be treated as an 
equal. This cut-off point is necessitated by the fact that going beyond this, 
that is, trying to account for degrees of rationality, leads to the conclusion 
that there is no basis to view all individuals as equals (Carter, 2012: 559, 
558, 541ff.). After all, not all individuals are created equally rational. In 
order for egalitarianism to be justified, then, individuals should be granted 
the right to ‘conceal’6 features of themselves (for instance, to what degree 
they are rational, above a certain minimum) from policymakers. Carter 
goes on to reflect on the virtue of a certain kind of political blindness:
‘The ethical commitment not to expose agents to [a problematisation of 
their subjectivity, JK] is illustrated by the high value that political liberals 
place on liberty in the negative sense of the term. Negative liberty is 
normally thought of as the absence of constraints that originate “outside” 
the agent. Positive conceptions of liberty, by contrast, take into account 
constraints that have their origin “inside” the agent —constraints like 
weakness of the will, the endorsement of distorted or illusory value 
perspectives, or the propensity to make choices that are irrational and/
or inﬂuenced by various alien forces. As a result of their focus on the 
external conditions of freedom, liberals are often accused of short 
sightedness, of being “blind” to those less obvious internal constraints on 
freedom that are visible only to the more penetrating eyes of the advocate 
of positive liberty. But the blindness is deliberate, the lack of penetration 
a conscious […] stance.’ (Carter, 2012: 558-559)
In order to see how this affects our investigation of gender justice, 
we need only to consider that the analysis required by NHV is precisely 
of the ‘internal’ kind, bearing on particular preferences. It does not seem 
unwarranted to assert that the gender-problematic preferences fall into the 
category of ‘endorsement of distorted value perspectives’. Thus, we could 
apply Carter’s analysis to contend that in order to apply a normative scale 
to an individual’s preferences, we would already have to withhold from 
them the respect they are due. Carter (2012: 559) calls this kind of respect 
‘opacity respect’ and remarks that ‘adopting […] what Strawson called an 
“objective attitude”’ is a violation of it. Indeed, it seems clear that seeing 
certain people as objects in need of repair is a problematisation of their 
subjectivity and that on Carter’s account, there are good reasons to resist 
such an attitude in the context of political philosophy.
One may object that this analysis departs from a very particular notion 
of respect. Carter thinks it is required in order to provide a sound basis for 
egalitarianism, but perhaps his argument is flawed, or there are other such 
bases, or perhaps egalitarianism is best avoided. We should recognise, how-
ever, that it is plausible that opacity respect is a salient kind of respect, as it 
is possible to argue that political relations could in general be described as 
requiring opacity respect. To give some examples of this: we do not expect 
the state to form judgments as to the degree in which we are capable of, 
for example, casting sufficiently informed votes, making rational decisions, 
adopting the right goals, choosing the right partners, having children at 
the most suitable moment in our lives (cf. Carter, 2012: 554 f.). The state’s 
occasional failure to respect its boundaries has provoked Elizabeth Anderson 
into exclaiming: ‘How dare the state pass judgments on its citizens’ worth 
as workers and lovers!’ (Anderson, 1999: 305). The importance of such a 
demarcation between the domains of competence of the individual and those 
of the state is entirely consistent with the Rawlsian framework assumed by 
this paper, and with liberal political philosophy more generally. Of course, 
this is precisely the reason why some gender justice theorists would reject 
Carter’s account: liberalism will not do. However, the discussion of Carter 
does show that many ‘common sense’ views on political relations and per-
haps the basis of egalitarianism itself depend, to some degree, on a rejection 
of Strawson-objective attitudes. What remains to be seen is what an applica-
tion of Strawson-objectivity in the context of politics would entail.
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Like the Strawson-objective attitude, opacity respect requires a certain 
kind of distance. The two kinds of distance in play, however, are very different 
from one another. While Strawson-objectivity concerns treating individuals 
in a way that partially robs them of their humanity, opacity respect ignores 
certain features of human beings as a matter of principle in order to treat 
them as fully human, a trait they have in common with all other humans. 
Especially when applied to my case, that of preferences, a remarkable reversal 
can be seen: the Strawson-objective attitude starts out with the observation 
that particular preferences lead to injustice. Hence, justice requires that such 
preferences be reformed. The distance required in order to exercise opacity 
respect, by contrast, refuses to take particular facts about individuals into 
consideration, because it values the conclusion that all are, in fact, equal 
for political purposes. While Carter’s attempt to provide a solid basis for 
egalitarianism provides a useful contrast to Strawson-objectivity, an example 
from politics itself will shed further light on its political variety. By present-
ing it, I want to highlight the applicability of the concept, and also to discuss 
a case of Strawson-objectivity that is politically problematic.
A particularly political hierarchy of preferences was established in the con-
text of Marxism. The concept of false consciousness was invoked in order to 
explain why some had heard the objective truth of Marxism, but had not 
been persuaded by it. In this way, the ascription of false consciousness is part 
of ideology critique7, of which Peter Sloterdijk (1983: 54) has stated that 
it necessarily entails an ‘objectification’ of the opponent. This is so because 
in order to engage in ideology critique, we have to provide an explanation 
for the opponent’s position that operates behind her consciousness, thus 
stripping her of her subjectivity. After all, one is never consciously helpless to 
fend off the influence of an intruding ideology, so that someone will have 
to point it out to us that we are in its grasp, though purely rational means 
may not suffice in such cases (cf. Kloeg, 2011: 7f.). In the context of gender 
justice, we may say that someone who spends enough time under the influ-
ence of gender-biased media is likely to take on a gender-biased position 
herself, even without her knowing it. If such influences exist, then rational 
argumentation will not be sufficient to counteract them. Again, we can at 
most ‘pretend to reason’ with such a person, and will finally resort to ‘curing 
or training’ her (cf. Strawson 1974: 10)8. Clearly, then, the ascription of false 
consciousness is a prime example of the objective attitude, and one history 
has shown to be quite problematic. Again, to invoke this kind of explanation 
is to cast ‘dissenters’ in a certain light. There are at least two major arguments 
to be made against such an approach.
4. Moral personality
Carter’s account described above presents us with an argument from egali-
tarianism, which establishes the conclusion that a politically salient kind 
of respect is violated if we assume a Strawson-objective attitude. In this 
section, I will develop arguments to the effect that human moral personal-
ity exceeds any set of statements of fact about human beings, building on 
the work of Immanuel Kant. These arguments combine well with Carter’s 
view that moral personality supervenes on empirical qualities (we have 
considered rationality), which offers a way to make empirical science 
relevant for political philosophy. I want to have my cake and eat it too: 
empirical science is indeed relevant, but moral personality still needs to be 
distinguished from empirical matters. The two sets of arguments do not 
depend on each other, but should be viewed as complementary objections 
against Strawson-objectivity in general and NHV in particular.
My strategy consists of two parts. First, I will consider the reduction 
of practical reason to theoretical reason. Political philosophy is not just a 
description of what is the case in the world, but is inherently normative. It 
therefore seems that more than just (empirical) statements of fact are rel-
evant in this context. NHV incorporates empirical facts too directly, or so 
I will argue. Second, I will proceed to consider this reduction in the light 
of the criterion of publicity, which states that principles of justice should 
be able to generate their own support if they were made public.
4.1 The reduction of practical reason to theoretical reason
There is a difficulty stemming from an all too direct use of empirical data 
concerning preference formation in the context of practical philosophy. I 
have already considered an elaboration of the case of a career-sacrificing 
mother who ‘possesses reasons for acting as she does’, but is not to be held 
fully accountable for her decision, because of the influence of sexist norms 
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and images (Mason, 2000: 242). Such an analysis suggests that if struc-
tural factors could be made to impact the mother’s decision differently, 
she would be more likely to decide differently as a result. She would pre-
sumably also offer different reasons in support of her way of life. In other 
words, the reasons she offers vary with the kind of structure that shaped 
them. Her reasons do have causal power in the sense that her behaviour 
can be explained in part by reference to them, but it is very possible to 
regard the content of her reasons as having themselves been caused by 
structural factors.
The picture thus painted requires that we think of individuals, their 
particular preferences and the reasons offered in support as products of 
structural features of their environments. Of course, the theorist of justice 
is also in the business of offering reasons, albeit in a more theoretical and 
systematized fashion. It is surely the latter characteristic of her reasoning 
to which a theorist would point if asked why her arguments should be 
accepted at all: science can offer us a larger perspective, thus increasing 
our understanding of the world. But what if her scientific arguments clash 
with the morally permitted preferences of individuals? The only ‘scientific’ 
response is to reduce the domain of their practical reasoning to underly-
ing societal patterns that can be empirically observed. We could wonder 
whether such a reduction has normative consequences. Immanuel Kant 
has argued that even complete predictability of an agent’s conduct would 
not be a sufficient condition for the rejection of freedom, conceived of as 
a practical postulate:  
‘If it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a man’s character 
as shown both in inner and in outer actions, that every, even the least, 
incentive to these actions and all external occasions which affect them 
were so known to us that his future conduct could be predicted with as 
great a certainty as the occurrence of a solar or lunar eclipse, we could 
nevertheless still assert that the man is free.’ (Kant, 1788/1949: 204-
205)
Thus, Kant hammers home the point that there is a difference between 
the theoretical and the practical perspective. The most radical consequence 
of his view that Sein (the constitution of reality) occupies a different realm 
than Sollen (moral obligation) is that we may not infer an instance of the 
latter from any particular matter of fact9. For our purposes, it would fol-
low that whether or not structural factors can reliably predict an agent’s 
choices, we should still consider her to be free in the practical sense needed 
to apply normative criteria. In the words of Rawlsian liberalism: to uphold 
such an image of the free agent in the face of what might seem to be water-
tight empirical explanations of behaviour is ‘political, not metaphysical’10. 
We should conceive of other people as being able to act freely: if not, then 
we deny they have a capacity to act morally, i.e. to make their own choices, 
thus robbing them of their dignity. Kant puts it as follows: ‘[M]orality is 
the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself 
[…]. Thus morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has 
dignity’ (Kant, 1785/2008: 73). 
There is another conclusion to be drawn here. It follows from Kant’s 
well known formula that ‘no agent should ever be treated solely as a means, 
but always also as an end in himself ’ (Kant, 1785/2008: 65) that it is 
immoral to view the actions of particular individuals, let alone human 
agency in general, as being determined by external causes, or as heter-
onomous, rather than by their own autonomy. This is so because the 
heteronomous human being cannot be said to possess dignity, at least 
according to Kant.
There is surely a sense in which he was right. From the perspective 
of justice, reducing practical reasoning to a set of empirical conditions is 
a carte blanche to fans of paternalism, who are free to explore the conse-
quences of a human species incapable of being an end in itself – so that a 
human being is now merely a means. To forego the category of autonomy 
in political philosophy in this way11, while at the same time continuing 
to formulate substantive normative guidelines (as ends) is to turn the 
tables on the idea of neutrality. For if we would demand compliance to 
these normative guidelines, we would deny those affected by them the 
opportunity to relate to them in a meaningful way. Instead of heeding 
their words of protest, we would have to tweak them into compliance, 
as Strawson might have put it. Thus, the right to determine the meaning 
of a good life, which was, according to Rawlsian neutrality, the preroga-
tive of individuals, has now been transferred to those in a position to 
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manipulate others. Politics has been transformed into social engineering 
and solutions to problems of injustice will have to be phrased in terms 
of the latter12.
At this point, one may object that I am presupposing that the polit-
ical philosopher has a particular role to play in society. This may or may 
not be warranted, the critic continues, but in this case it is problem-
atic because it is not the role that gender justice theorists themselves 
see as properly theirs. My earlier claim that Strawson-objectivity is not 
concerned with the view any theorist has of her own work now seems 
problematic. In order to reply to this line of criticism, I will give an 
overview of possible conceptions of the role of political philosophy and 
consider whether any of them affects my argument, and if so, in what 
way. We should begin by remembering that proponents of NHV see 
some preferences as problematic and advocate the solution that they 
be reformed in some way: but how should we understand this call for 
reform? The three possible conceptions I will consider are to be under-
stood in terms of the role political philosophy has to play in relation to 
public debate. 
The first conception of the role of political philosophy is that it should 
overrule public debate completely. No matter what the prevalent values of 
a given society are, philosophy should tell us, for every political problem, 
what the best solution is. It is clear that my argument works in this case, 
because political philosophy would completely ignore the autonomy of 
individuals. Potentially, it would oppress and manipulate them. In another 
vocabulary: this approach is completely top-down. 
The second is that political philosophy should clarify or regulate 
public debate. In both of these capacities, political philosophy is able to 
judge public debate and function as a kind of referee. Thus, while the 
philosopher does recognise its value, she simultaneously places herself 
outside of it. This a hybrid form, which recognises that political philoso-
phy cannot supply all values, but still sees it as its task to comment on 
the way values have been shaped within a given society. This conception, 
like the first, would phrase the solution to societal problems in terms 
that presuppose Strawson-objectivity. The political philosopher enjoys a 
privileged position and knows best as a result.
The third is that the political philosopher should ‘merely’ participate 
in public debate, that is to say, consider herself to be on equal footing 
with any other participant (‘all votes to count as one’). This approach is 
completely bottom-up. Would it make my argument problematic? The 
intended impact of a philosophical position should be distinguished from 
its contents: and I think that in this case my argument is justifiably applied 
to the contents regardless of the intended impact. Even if we conceive of 
NHV as nothing but a template for discussion, its contribution to any 
actual discussion would still consist in a reduction of the practical reason 
of some individuals to theoretical reason. This is equally true for all three 
conceptions.
I have by no means provided a complete overview, but I think the 
above considerations make it plausible that my argument does not depend 
on theorists’ views on the role of political philosophy in society.
A further point should be made here. In some cases it seems perfectly 
legitimate for a gender justice theorist to advance reasons why particular 
preferences should be reformed. Let us imagine a theorist speaking at a 
conference in an attempt to convince her audience to be mindful of the 
unwanted societal consequences of some morally permitted preferences. 
She may well point to particular kinds of preferences as examples. I readily 
concede that this kind of setting evades my argument, but only because 
of a change of scenario: the theorist at the conference is not discussing the 
just society, whereas this is precisely the point of NHV. The latter requires 
that particular preferences be identified and grouped together on the basis 
of their consequences in terms of justice. If a preference is identified as 
having unjust societal consequences, NHV prescribes social reform. At 
this point, we should recognize that advocating political measures (such as 
social reform) is not on a par with exchanging arguments with individu-
als. Gender justice theorists generally recognize this distinction: it is no 
coincidence that they phrase their solutions in terms of social reform. In 
particular, NHV does not advise us to argue with every individual whose 
preferences have unjust consequences. This is understandable, because in 
some cases the willingness of an individual to accept conclusions may itself 
be influenced by preference formation processes: I have already pointed 
out that according to NHV the reasons offered by individuals will vary 
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with the kind of structure that shaped them (reasoned arguments are 
insufficient when gender-biased media exert decisive influence, to recall 
an earlier example). But it also means that NHV assumes a Strawson-
objective attitude and is thus susceptible to my argument.
4.2 The criterion of publicity
The criterion of publicity requires principles of justice to be able to gener-
ate their own support if they are made public: if the general population 
resists the principle, this tells us that the latter does not really promote jus-
tice. The criterion was introduced into political philosophy by Immanuel 
Kant (1795/1984) and is also a component of Rawls’s theory of justice. Let 
us assume that it is indeed a criterion for principles of justice. Strawson-
objective attitudes in the context of justice are then problematic. To invoke 
an objective explanation for a set of preferences and then to claim that the 
composition of the set should be altered requires not only the reduction 
put forward in the previous paragraphs, but also a normative scale that 
orders preferences in terms of their desirability. If we assume that individu-
als are born into different sets of circumstances, and display a wide variety 
of preferences, there will be individuals whose way of life is to be found 
at the wrong end of that scale. No matter how they react, they will incur 
costs as a result. Either they will switch lifestyles when confronted with 
the scale, thus having to live in ways that they are not optimally suited 
for because of their past lives, or they will have to come to terms with the 
higher price tag henceforth attached to their preferred way of life. Perhaps 
an example will serve to make this clear: an individual may have a strong 
preference, say the idea that motherhood and the pursuit of a career are 
compatible, and have invested a lot of time and effort into a lifestyle that 
is built on this idea. Its rejection would thus require that she forfeit her 
investments and, additionally, invest additional resources into a new way 
of life. This may entail re-education and a switch from one social group to 
the other, for instance. If she does not choose to reject the idea, she will 
likewise incur costs when the scale is applied.
Perhaps even more crucially, there is also the matter of principles. 
Those who do not already live ‘neutral’ lives would be exposed to treat-
ment that can be compared to the examples that Wolff (1998) describes 
as instances of ‘shameful revelation’. While it can be humiliating to 
have to reveal that one lacks talents others have, it is surely no less 
humiliating to have to admit to oneself (let alone to others) that one’s 
preferences go against the interests of other groups. Let us revisit the 
idea of the compatibility of motherhood with the pursuit of a career. 
It would surely be an immense blow to the values of those living in 
modern Western societies, whether they are themselves mothers or not, 
if such a preference turned out to be the dubious product of prior cir-
cumstances.  More generally, assuming that the causal link between an 
agent’s environment and her preferences is tenable, such an instance of 
shameful revelation would signify that the way the individual (say, the 
mother pursuing a career) has been brought up was wrong, that at least 
many of the influences that she internalized have led her astray. Like 
the talents we lack, the circumstances into which we are born are not 
the product of our choices. It may be more meaningful to insist on the 
reverse claim that our circumstances selected many of our characteristics 
for us. If this holds for those preferences that are of great importance 
to us, and it is subsequently declared that our preferences are harmful 
to society, this is likely to be somewhat of a shock. Any institution that 
would attempt to justify such a position would surely meet with resist-
ance of those who are affected. Imagine what a letter from the Equality 
Board13 on this subject might say:
To those who do not already live as prescribed by recent policy measures: 
we feel sorry to inform you that the way you choose to conduct your life, 
as well as your preferences more generally, can ultimately be explained 
by reference to the environment in which they were shaped, and that 
this has proven to be an influence that leads you to prefer ways of life 
that lead to social injustices. Perhaps your upbringing was wrong, or 
perhaps you were exposed to other corrosive influences. We would like 
to emphasise that you cannot be blamed for the way you turned out. 
The EB will endeavour to provide you with opportunities to eradicate 
the older influences in favour of better ones as soon as possible. We will 
also provide specially tailored schooling for your children in order to 
compensate for the influence your current lifestyle has to date exerted 
on them, and perhaps will continue to exert on them in the future.
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Many people would be enraged if such a letter were to fall on their 
doorstep, whether or not their lifestyle actually conflicted with the 
principles embraced by their government. The point is not only that 
we would feel humiliated if addressed in such a manner ourselves, but 
also that no one should be treated in this way. No government would 
dare to send a letter like this, no matter how carefully worded. So per-
haps its officials would try to keep their measures quiet. They would 
have to depoliticise their own actions, treating the results as anony-
mous forces rather than the result of reasoned political decisions. The 
very fact that they could not be made public may lead us to pursue 
several lines of argument. We could follow Rawls, and reason that a 
political structure that embraces principles unfit for publication is 
unstable because the principles will shape society in ways that do not 
correspond to citizens’ wishes in this respect, thus leaving them with a 
disincentive to participate in social cooperation on a state-level (Rawls, 
1999: 15, 153-158), perhaps preferring to form fringe groups directed 
at political reform. To put it more simply, we should not expect those 
who have been exposed to this kind of measure, whether explicitly or 
only by perceiving their effects, to cooperate with the political actor 
responsible for them as if nothing had happened. Kant (1795/1984: 50) 
takes an even more principled stance, stating that ‘all actions relating to 
the right of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is incompat-
ible with publicity’.
Again, it seems that these arguments have some force. The objec-
tive attitude is typically assumed in cases where we feel a certain kind 
of reaction is called for. Revealing cases where the objective attitude is 
appropriate are Strawson’s examples of the neurotic and the young child. 
If we are indeed to approach individuals with certain sets of preferences 
in a similar way, it seems that both Rawls’s and Kant’s arguments obtain. 
Whether policymakers would be quiet about the objective attitude they 
assume or not, the latter would indeed count as a disincentive to par-
ticipate in social cooperation, and referring to the general population in 
such terms would indeed seem to constitute a wrong. This is all the more 
apparent if we remind ourselves that the preferences under consideration 
are morally uncontroversial.
I think these arguments show that the problem presented by prefer-
ences cannot be solved by NHV. More generally, every theory of justice 
that depends on the assumption of an objective attitude will have to ward 
off these very arguments, cashed out in a way that depends on the specific 
theory at issue.
5. The search for alternatives
We should thus avoid Strawson-objectivity when thinking about justice. 
In the context of moral philosophy, this attitude is akin to ‘keeping one’s 
distance’ as a means to suspend harsh judgments on those who we feel 
cannot be held responsible for their actions. In political philosophy, the 
requirement to keep one’s distance, that is to abstain from judging factors 
internal to the agent, actually precludes the kind of diagnosis that would 
be needed in order to assume an objective attitude. If we start by assuming 
that some particular preferences need to be fixed, reformed, and the like, 
we run into the objections envisaged in this paper. 
If my account is convincing, we are left to wonder what alternatives 
to pursue. Preferences seem to pose a fundamental challenge to ‘classical’ 
theories of justice, as was recognised by the gender justice theorists I dis-
cussed: but if their accounts can, in turn, be justifiably argued against, as 
I have tried to do, then it seems we have reached an impasse. Surely it is 
not desirable to return to a theory of justice that takes individual prefer-
ences at face value? It seems intuitive that the (empirical) observations that 
motivate gender justice should affect our thinking about social reforms, 
particularly if we are political philosophers. Is there a third way?
I believe that Carter can point us to a possible solution. He advo-
cates ‘an indirect pursuit of equality’, which he takes to describe practices 
that aim to make the distribution of resources (very broadly construed: 
I will use the ability to make informed decisions as an example shortly) 
as equal as possible ‘without assessing the degrees to which individuals 
[currently] possess’ the relevant resources (Carter, 2012: 562). We need 
only refrain from such assessment if the resources are of the ‘internal’ kind 
(ibid.). The focus should be on ‘other goods, the distribution of which is in 
some way empirically correlated’ to the distribution of the resources under 
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consideration (ibid). Institutions should try to create circumstances that 
will generally foster the positive freedom of individuals, while abstaining 
from the identification of particular constraining factors. The amelioration 
of societies should thus be based on considerations of a general nature (cf. 
ibid.: 559). To give an example of how this works: if a policymaker wants 
all citizens to be equally able to make informed decisions, her first step 
should not be to assess the degrees to which each individual is capable 
of doing so currently. Instead, she should try to establish empirical cor-
relations. Let us assume empirical studies find that adequate schooling 
generally enables one to make informed decisions. In that case, the policy-
maker should aim to provide adequate schooling for all citizens in order to 
achieve her original goal.
I am here advocating that Carter’s approach to distributive questions 
be applied to the case of preferences. By taking this route, we can do the 
extremely valuable empirical work of establishing correlations, but with-
out using the particularities of the data to directly inform our theory of 
justice, which would imply the assumption of an objective attitude. 
The empirical work would surely (need to) shed light on preferences 
and formation processes. But we need to be careful when drawing the 
normative consequences from such information, because preferences are 
indeed of the internal kind. An indirect pursuit of justice is called for in 
response to the societal impact of preferences. Such a pursuit should not 
begin by seeing certain kinds of morally permitted preferences as prob-
lems to be solved, but theorise instead on considerations of a more general 
nature. At present, I can do no more than offer my own intuitions and 
give some examples as to how the alternative approach might work. Fur-
ther research has to be done in order to substantiate what now remains a 
somewhat speculative proposal.
The ability to reflect on one’s preferences will generally enable one to 
take the societal consequences of one’s preferences into account, while also 
mediating the influence of antecedent formative processes. Intuitively, if 
more individuals would possess this ability, society would become more 
just, because it is precisely the ease with which societal consequences are 
overlooked and the self-perpetuating force of formative processes that lead 
to the kind of injustice I have considered throughout this paper. 
This intuitive link between the ability to be reflexive and just outcomes, 
if convincing, should motivate us to seek out empirical correlations. Con-
sider, for instance, the courses on comparative religion that are sometimes 
taught in schools. The realisation that there are other profound religions 
enables someone who has been raised in a strictly Christian environment, 
for example, to reflect on beliefs and practices that would otherwise have 
been taken for granted (or rejected out of hand). A similar course could 
be offered as part of a social science curriculum: one that covers different 
ways of seeing the relations between the genders in a fair and balanced way. 
Someone who has been raised in a gender-biased background may take 
pause to reflect: the most important thing is that she will be able to do so. 
We have seen the concept of distance at work in both Strawson and Carter: 
the ability to assume a (reflexive) distance towards one’s own preferences is 
the third branch on that tree.
None of this is to say that preferences that have been reflected upon 
are in any way better than other preferences, or that reflection should be 
made obligatory. I have been describing the merits of an ability, not of 
an actual practice. Nor am I assuming that everyone will be completely 
convinced by the cause of gender justice, or by any other position, for 
opposing positions will also be expounded. After all, the student who was 
raised as a Muslim or an atheist will also learn about Christianity, and the 
feminist student will also learn about more traditional ways. Finally, it is 
not possible for earlier formative processes to be cancelled out entirely, so 
that they will continue to exert some influence. But, given that the result-
ing preferences are morally permissible, why would we want to cancel out 
entirely the processes that produced them? 
The point is that the ability to reflect on one’s preferences allows 
one to take on a more neutral perspective with respect to the preferences 
themselves. It is precisely the kind of neutrality that Rawlsians and gen-
der justice theorists alike embrace as their political ideal: seeing beyond 
one’s own particular interests and taking alternative points of view equally 
seriously. This kind of approach would avoid the charge of objectifica-
tion because no one is deciding on the relative (de)merit of any given 
preference. Instead, I am recommending that the freedom (not) to adopt 
any preference be enlarged to the highest possible degree by presenting as 
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many alternatives as possible in a fair and balanced way. I think we can 
hope to solve the second shift and career-sacrificing mother cases only 
by maximally enabling ‘second shifters’, career-sacrificing mothers and all 
those who help to shape the lives of both (for instance, those who share a 
household with them) to reflect on the preferences involved and the result-
ing ways of life.
Of course, there are many ways to incorporate this account into a the-
ory of justice, so that the sketch presented in this section is by no means a 
full-fledged theory. While this paper did not set out to develop a complete 
theory of justice, my hope is that it has cleared the way for other papers 
to do so. One of the most important remaining tasks is to provide a pre-
cise definition of reflexivity and to develop the intuitions and hypothetical 
empirical correlations that I have put on the table.
At this stage, however, I find it likely that an adequate theory of jus-
tice would involve some kind of unconditionality. The theory could not 
proceed in terms of the identification of individuals and their differential 
properties (including preferences) in a direct way, imparting benefits to the 
group on the ‘right’ side of the threshold, and not the other. A popular 
move is to compensate only those disadvantaged individuals who are not 
themselves responsible for their disadvantaged position. However, it is not 
up to theories of justice to make such distinctions of responsibility14, which 
does not preclude that such distinctions may be of value in another way. 
Conclusion
Preferences are a problem for theories of justice, because they are personal 
and deserving of respect on the one hand, and have a deep and lasting 
impact on society on the other. In response to the ensuing dilemma, pro-
ponents of NHV have argued that justice requires the reform of particular 
preferences, namely those that can be found at the wrong end of the 
normative hierarchy. According to my analysis, this presupposes Strawson-
objectivity: individuals are seen as having preferences that need to be cured 
or trained. Ian Carter’s notion of opacity respect supplies an alternative, 
so that Strawson-objective accounts of intuitions may be countered by 
invoking Carter. He argues that the kind of diagnosis required in order to 
assume such an attitude already requires a violation of a politically salient 
kind of respect. Furthermore, at the more general level, there are at least 
two major problems with the kind of objectification that is at stake in 
those accounts: it requires a reduction of practical reason to theoretical 
reason and is incompatible with the criterion of publicity.
While NHV is an attempted solution to problems that are very real, 
I have concluded that its stress on the societal impact of preferences leads 
its proponents to forego the personal aspect of preferences. I have argued 
that autonomy should not be sacrificed in this way. It is also clear, how-
ever, that the (empirical) observations that inspired the accounts of gender 
justice reveal striking injustices. As a possible way out of this impasse, I 
have taken Carter’s argument that equality should be pursued indirectly 
and applied it to preferences. I have concluded that particular preferences 
should not occupy theories of justice, but that in general, we should pur-
sue justice indirectly by maximally enabling reflexivity. What this entails 
in specific cases will depend to some extent on the notion of reflexivity 
that is adopted.
Preferences need to be addressed by theories of justice – but addressed 
with much care.
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review procedure. For more information, see http://www.eur.nl/fw/eng-
lish/esjp/submissions.
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Notes
1. The dilemma is similar to the potential conflict between fairness and respect as described 
by Wolff (1998, 2010), and with the so-called ‘liberal paradox’ of whether or not to tole-
rate the intolerant. However, in our case, respect does not essentially apply to the status of 
persons, but to their preferences. We will see what exactly this entails in the context of our 
discussion of gender justice.
2. In the next paragraph, I suggest there is a gap between an issue’s being on the social 
agenda and its being effectively counteracted. However, we should also note that there 
may be preferences on the societal agenda that have been criminalized, for instance, the 
criminalisation of homosexual acts and relationships. This entails that even though the 
social status of a preference is an important heuristic device, we have to be able and willing 
to re-examine cases where we have intuitions or reasons to think that a given preference 
requires philosophical examination.
3. Perhaps, as suggested by the idea of ‘repressive tolerance’, the popular illusion that femi-
nism has accomplished its goals itself contributes to the continued subjection of women, 
because their position in modern societies is no longer seen as problematic.
4. That is to say, the preferences as they are (including their history in terms of gender 
formation processes) are an object of criticism for ‘extended’ theories of justice. I will speak 
of ‘preferences’ in this sense for the remainder of the paper.
5. Carter uses the notion of ‘range properties’: for an explanation of the kind of property 
he has in mind, see Carter (2012: 548-550) and Rawls (1999: 443).
6. Carter insightfully compares this to Thomas Nagel’s (2002) notion of concealment as a 
basic human need.
7. Similarly, some feminists find an explanation for its only partial success in the fact that 
society is shaped and continues to be shaped in ways that counteract the basic tenets of 
feminism, so that even most members of the group whose interests it represents have inter-
nalised justice-inhibiting norms and acquired justice-inhibiting preferences.
8. Another way to look at it would be as follows: if we come to the conclusion that her posi-
tion is wrong, but are unable to convince her by our arguments, then there must be some 
factor that is inhibiting her judgment. This kind of analysis is characteristic of the ascrip-
tion of false consciousness, but not of the assumption of the objective attitude in general.
9. Moore (1903) is the canonical work in the later tradition; for a dissenting view, see Searle 
(1964). I will assume throughout this paper that there is in fact a difference between Sein 
and Sollen.
10. See Rawls (1993).
11. Autonomy may, of course, enter at a later stage, such as Rawls’s ‘reflexive equilibrium’ 
(1999, e.g. 18-19 and 42-45). My contention is specifically that it should be part of con-
siderations of justice itself.
12. Compare the following analysis of the ‘expert state’: ‘Everything transpires as though 
the [just] law could be read in the open book of society’s statistics or on a world map’ 
(Rancière, 1992: 253).
13. The letter is inspired by similar ones composed by Anderson (1999: 305), which inform 
citizens that they were selected for compensation because of their lack of talent, disability, 
or ugliness. Anderson speaks of a ‘State Equality Board’, but we may equally think of an 
instutition or an association of citizens.
14. Compare Wolff’s (2010) criticism of Anderson (1999) in the context of the capability 
approach.
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